The New TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure Requirements

Farewell, HUD-1, we hardly knew ye. As of October 3rd, 2015, lenders will provide two integrated forms at specified intervals surrounding the closing date to comply with the provisions of both the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (“RESPA”). The new forms are the result of provisions from Sections 1098 and 1100A of the Dodd-Frank Act meant to combine and simplify existing documents to make them easier for mortgagors to understand.

Family meeting real-estate agent for house investmentTILA (implemented through Regulation Z) and RESPA (implemented through Regulation X) both require specific disclosures to be made at the closing of a mortgage loan. RESPA requires that consumers receive a Good Faith Estimate (“GFE”) within three business days of applying for a mortgage loan. Within one business day before the settlement of the loan, the consumer has the right to request the Settlement Statement (HUD-1), with the document provided at closing. TILA also requires that mortgage lenders provide a disclosure of lending terms within three business days of receiving a mortgage loan application. These requirements have been fulfilled through separate disclosure forms created by two different agencies, thus leading to confusion between lenders and consumers at closing time, as the forms used inconsistent language. The HUD-1 is a settlement statement created by the Department of Housing and Urban Development to satisfy the requirements of RESPA when it was administered by that agency. The Federal Reserve Board enforced TILA.

Dodd-Frank changed these requirements by creating the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) and charging it with enforcing the provisions of both TILA and RESPA as well as creating integrated disclosures that effectuate the disclosure provisions of both laws through one set of forms, rather than two. To that end, the CFPB issued the Final Rule for the integrated disclosure requirements on November 20, 2013 and amendments to the Final Rule on February 19, 2015. This new TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure rule, otherwise also known as “Know Before You Owe,” created two required documents to replace the TILA and RESPA disclosures – a Loan Estimate that replaces the GFE and TILA disclosures at the time of application, and a Closing Disclosure that supplants the HUD-1 Settlement Statement.

As with the GFE and TILA disclosures, the Loan Estimate must be provided to consumers no later than three business days after they submit an application for a loan. The Loan Estimate form requires the loan amount and terms, projected payments, closing costs, the estimated cash needed to close and other considerations, such as whether the lender intends to transfer the servicing of the loan. The Closing Disclosure includes similar provisions, although it also includes details of the escrow account, a summary of the transaction and the contact information of the lender, the settlement agent, the mortgage broker, and the real estate brokers for both buyer and seller.

Possibly the biggest change for lenders and mortgage brokers is that the Closing Disclosure must be provided to the consumer at least three business days prior to the consummation of the transaction – the point where the consumer becomes contractually obligated to the creditor on the loan. This may be different than the actual closing date. This is a much more stringent requirement than the one-day prior to closing on consumer request requirement of the HUD-1, and can potentially delay closing, as last-minute changes the transaction may trigger a need for a revised Closing Disclosure with a new three-day waiting period. This can happen when there are increases in the APR, any additions of a prepayment penalty or the change of a loan product will trigger the need for a revised closing disclosure

MHagginMary Estes Haggin is a Member of McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC.  Ms. Haggin practices in virtually every aspect of real estate law, including title examination, title insurance, clearing title issues, deeds, settlement statements, preparation of loan documentation, contract negotiation and preparation, lease negotiation and preparation, and any and all other needs related to residential and commercial real estate matters.  She is located in the firm’s Lexington office and can be reached at or at (859) 231-8780.

This article is intended as a summary of  federal and state law and does not constitute legal advice.


Suing Your Tenant for Damages – Can You Recover Attorney’s Fees?

It’s one of the larger mines in the minefield of renting out property as a landlord – what happens when the tenant breaches the lease? What happens when the tenant doesn’t pay? In and among the questions presented by such a scenario is whether a suit against the tenant would be cost-effective. The landlord’s decision may, in large part, depend on whether the landlord is entitled to recover its costs and attorney fees associated with prosecuting its claim against the tenant. And, in Kentucky, the landlord’s right to recover costs and attorney fees depends on the circumstances surrounding the tenant’s breach of the lease.

Kentucky has adopted the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (KRS 383.500 to 383705)(hereinafter the “Act”), which governs transactions between those parties in jurisdictions where the Act has been adopted and enacted.[1] The discussion herein is limited to jurisdictions where the Act has been adopted. Pursuant to the Act, KRS 383.570 lists provisions that landlords are prohibited from including in lease agreements. Specifically, KRS 383.570(1)(c) prohibits provisions that require tenants to agree to pay the landlord’s attorney fees under any circumstances.

However, while lease agreements may not require the payment of attorney fees from the outset, the recovery of attorney fees and costs by the landlord is permitted under other parts of the Act. For instance, KRS 383.660(3) states that “If the tenant’s noncompliance is willful the landlord may recover actual damages and reasonable attorney’s fees.” However, it must be determined whether the tenant’s conduct is “willful” before any such recovery is permitted under the Act.

In Batson v. Clark, 980 S.W.2d 566 (Ky. App. 1998), the Kentucky Court of Appeals noted Kentucky’s general policy against awarding attorney’s fees as costs in the absence of a statute or contract provision specifically allowing for recovery. With regard to the award of attorney’s fees under KRS 383.660, the Kentucky Court of Appeals very clearly stated that it views the prohibitions in KRS 383.570 as a strong indicator of “public policy disfavoring a landlord’s recovery of attorney’s fees incurred in an action against a tenant.”[2] The Court determined the mere failure to pay rent, accompanied by requests for more time or promises to pay, did not rise to the level of “willful” as defined by the statute.[3] The Court found a strong presumption against the award of attorney fees and set a high bar with regard to declaring a tenant’s noncompliance with a lease “willful.”

Hispanic couple outside home for rentHowever, there are circumstances where attorney fees are recoverable. In Palladino v. Shropshire, 2013 WL 6730733 (Ky. App. 2013), the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a tenant’s deliberate damaging of the premises and keeping a pet in contravention of the lease rose to the level of willfulness as envisioned by the statute and left an award of attorney’s fees intact.

Thus, while the burden is high in establishing the right to recover attorney fees and costs, it is not insurmountable. In most situations, landlords will not be entitled to recover attorney fees when seeking damages from tenants for the nonpayment of rent. However, the landlord may be entitled to its attorney fees and costs where there is deliberate damage to the premises by the tenant and for other willful violations of the lease. For more information on the remedies available to landlords under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, contact the attorneys at McBrayer.

BYatesBrendan Yates joined the Lexington office of the firm as an associate in 2002. Brendan is a member of the firm’s Litigation Department, where he focuses his practice on construction and real estate litigation, workers’ compensation defense litigation, insurance defense and commercial litigation. He has successfully defended his clients in state and federal courts, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the Kentucky Supreme Court, and in administrative agency proceedings in Kentucky. He can be reached at or (859) 231-8780, ext. 208.

This article is intended as a summary of state and federal law and does not constitute legal advice.

[1] See KRS 383.500. It is important to note that, if adopted, the provisions of the Act must be adopted in their entirety and without amendment.

[2] O’Rourke v. Lexington Real Estate Company L.L.C., 365 S.W.3d 584, 586 (Ky. App. 2011).

[3] Id.

Use of Restrictive Covenants in the Zoning Process

Zoning categories and the uses that are allowable in each of them are subject to the possibility of amendment by the legislative body. This means that a property can apply to the planning authority to change his zoning designation or to add uses within that designation that are otherwise prohibited. However, many citizens incorrectly believe that zoning designations are permanent and that uses within each zoning category never change. When a neighboring property owner files to rezone property, asking to amend the zoning ordinance to add a new use to a particular category that is prohibited, the neighbors become alarmed at the potential change to their area. Although neighboring property owners have a right to attend hearings and object to the proposed changes, they have no final say or authority as to whether the governmental body approves it. This can lead to zoning battles.

Sometimes zone change applicants will offer to impose restrictive covenants on the property they are seeking to rezone in order to address neighbor concerns. Restrictive covenants, when recorded and enforceable by the neighbors, are a powerful way to protect property from zoning changes that otherwise the neighbors would consider too intensive or inappropriate.

Sketching Of Building Construction On Flying Book Over Urban SceRestrictive covenants are restrictions on land use that are recorded in the county clerk’s office. Restrictions run with the land and last for a term of years, often in 10 or 20 years renewable terms. They typically spell out who has the power to enforce them and how they are to be enforced. In general, restrictive covenants cannot be removed or modified without the written consent of the party who has the power to enforce them. Restrictive covenants can control issues that generally go beyond the reach of the government to regulate in the zoning process, for example architectural and design features, restricting certain uses or agreeing to preserve certain natural features.

Many governments do not enforce restrictive covenants of this nature because they are rightly considered private agreements. However, restrictive covenants can be a valuable tool to assuage opposition to zoning amendments if the proponent is willing to live with some restrictions on his property in order to reduce neighborhood objection to his proposal and thereby increase the chances the planning body will approve the zoning amendment.

CWestoverChristine Neal Westover is an attorney in the Lexington office of McBrayer. Ms. Westover has extensive experience practicing law in both the public and the private sector. The focus of Ms. Westover’s experience and area of practice is land use law since her assignment in 1991 as legal advisor to the boards, commissions and divisions of government within Lexington Fayette County on all matters related to planning, zoning and land use law. Ms. Westover has an extremely deep and broad expertise of the laws governing land use in Kentucky and the procedural and substantive complexities that underpin planning and zoning matters. She also has significant experience dealing with governmental divisions such as Building Inspection, Code Enforcement and other administrative bodies due to their regulatory authority in land use matters. Ms. Westover can be reached at or (859) 231-8780, ext. 137.

AAA Revises Construction Arbitration Rules

New home constructionThe American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) revised its Construction Industry Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (“Rules”) as of July 1, 2015. Many of the changes are designed to streamline the arbitration process, making it more efficient and cost-effective. While there were many noteworthy changes in the rules, we summarize the most significant and far-reaching revised and new rules below. It is important to note that not all the revised or new rules will apply to contracts in effect before the rules took effect, so the following provisions may or may not apply to existing claims.


Possibly the most significant change in the rules is the addition of a phase of mediation in disputes in Rule R-10. Previously only an option, parties to a dispute are now required to mediate the disputes in a fashion prescribed in the AAA’s construction mediation procedure if any claim in the dispute exceeds $100,000 during the pendency of an arbitration. Parties may opt out of mediation after giving notice unless there is an agreement that requires mandatory mediation.

Emergency Relief

Concerns about speed and need for intervention led to the creation of new Rule R-39. Under new Rule R-39, a party may apply for emergency relief if it believes it will be subject to immediate and irreparable loss or damage. Within one business day of such notice for emergency relief, the AAA will appoint an emergency arbitrator, and that arbitrator will set a schedule for consideration of the application for emergency relief within two business days. The emergency arbitrator may then award such relief as he or she deems necessary. This rule only applies to arbitration agreements entered into after July 1, 2015.


New Rule R-7 fills a prior gap in the arbitration rules concerning joinder, setting the deadline of submission of requests for joinder or consolidation prior to the later of the selection of a Merits Arbitrator or within 90 days of the AAA determining that all filing requirements have been satisfied. Written responses to these requests must come within 10 or 14 days, respectively, of the AAA’s notice of such a request. Failure to object to joinder waives such objections.


If a party does not comply with obligations under the arbitration rules or any order of the arbitrator, new Rule R-60 allows the opposing party to request that the arbitrator impose sanctions on the noncompliant party.

Fast Tracking

Rule F-1 has been revised to apply to two-party cases where no claim or counterclaim exceeds $100,000. The earlier rule capped the applicability of fast tracking to claims of not more than $75,000.

Preliminary Hearing

Rule R-23 has been rewritten, providing that the timing of the preliminary hearing is at the arbitrator’s discretion and points to new Rules P-1 and P-2 to flesh out general and specific topics, respectively, to be discussed.

Pre-Hearing Exchange of Information

Rule R-24 has been revised so that an arbitrator may act on his or her own initiative or at the request of a party to (a) require the parties to exchange any information on which they will rely at the hearing, (b) update exchanges of information as more documentation becomes known to the parties, (c) require the parties to respond to document requests from the seeking party, and (d) require the parties, when documents to be produced are in electronic form, to make such documents available in the form most convenient and economical to the party in possession of such documents unless the arbitrator determines that the documents should be in a different form. The size and scope of such an electronic production of documents should be considered, and search parameters should be established at the outset of the exchange at the agreement of the parties or the determination of the arbitrator.

Dispositive Motions

New Rule R-34 allows an arbitrator to now consider motions that would dispose of part or all of a claim or would narrow the issues in a claim.

There are other changes to the rules that will serve to effectuate a more streamlined arbitration process, and these revisions should have a profound effect on the construction industry. The attorneys of McBrayer can assist with understanding how the new arbitration rules will affect alternative dispute resolution in construction claims. Contact us today for more information on how the new arbitration rules will affect you.

CRichardsonChristopher A. Richardson is an associate at McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC in the Louisville, KY office. Mr. Richardson concentrates primarily in real estate, where he is experienced in residential and commercial closing transactions, landlord/tenant relations, and mortgage lien enforcement/foreclosure. Mr. Richardson has closed innumerable secondary market and portfolio residential real estate transactions and his commercial practice ranges from short-term collateralized financing and construction lending to development revolving lines of credit. He can be reached at 502-327-5400 or This article is intended as a summary of  federal and state law and does not constitute legal advice.

Where the First Amendment and Land Use Meet: Planet Aid v. City of St. Johns

Generally speaking, land use regulations and zoning laws arise from practical and aesthetic concerns and considerations, and are driven by state and local law. However, sometimes a community’s desire to regulate a seemingly minor issue can implicate our most fundamental rights under the Constitution. Last month, we discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, which involved an analysis of the First Amendment’s applicability to local sign ordinances. Finding that restricting signage based on the content of the sign was impermissible under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court struck down Gilbert’s ordinance. Commentators have since described this as the “sleeper case” of the Supreme Court’s term, representing a substantial shift in First Amendment jurisprudence. The case has since been used to justify striking down local and state bans on political “robocalls” and panhandling, and could possibly extend to call in to question laws aimed at consumer protection and securities law. Indeed, Reed and the reaches of the First Amendment are currently in the forefront of controversies involving everything from soda labelling, to the rights of topless performers operating in Times Square.

However, the Supreme Court has not been the only Court to recently address the Constitutional implications of land use regulation. In April, prior the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (which includes Kentucky) reviewed an ordinance banning charitable donation bins as a public nuisance. Planet Aid, a nonprofit charity, placed outdoor donation bins on private property around the town of St. Johns, Michigan in an effort to solicit clothing donations. Believing that the bins constituted a nuisance, in that clutter and trash often collected around them, the City of St. Johns removed Planet Aid’s donation bins. Later, the city enacted an ordinance banning these unattended charitable bins. The Sixth Circuit, applying the same strict scrutiny standard subsequently applied in Reed, found that this ban of unattended charitable donation bins appears to be an impermissible content-based regulation of First Amendment-protected speech, and affirmed the District Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction.

Vertical image of the the first page of the US Bill or Rights on the American flagConsider that again for a moment: the Sixth Circuit has held that the mere presence of a standalone, outdoor, unattended donation bin implicates our rights of free speech and expression.

However, this conclusion is not as extreme as it may seem at first glance. The notion of charitable solicitations as speech is not new to First Amendment jurisprudence; as the Sixth Circuit pointed out in favor of upholding the injunction, it has a long history of protected status. In the Court’s view, even unattended donation bins inherently solicit and advocate for charitable causes, and thus are a form of speech. The court likened such bins to a person standing by the side of the road and holding a sign. The ordinance, the Court found, impermissibly attempted to regulate the content of its speech, as the ban applied only to charitable donation bins and not all varieties collection bins. Thus, bins with a charitable purpose were prohibited, where other bins, like recycling bins, would be free from restriction.

With hindsight, we can now see that the decision in Planet Aid tracks the same content-regulation rationale the Supreme Court espoused some two months later in Reed. These decisions should have state and local governments scrambling to review their regulations for potentially serious Constitutional defects. Cases like Reed and Planet Aid will likely have wide-ranging impacts on any variety of land use restrictions. Few laws survive “strict scrutiny” judicial review, and it appears that any regulation of any component of expression that regulates based on content will now be subject to that level of review. As such, even seemingly mundane land use restrictions must now be evaluated as potential infringements on some our most basic rights. The attorneys at McBrayer can assist local governments in reviewing their regulations for compliance with the brave new world of Reed and Planet Aid, working to bring regulations within acceptable Constitutional limits.

Jacob C. WalbournJacob C. Walbourn is an associate in McBrayer’s Lexington office. Mr. Walbourn focuses his area of practice on planning and zoning law handling a wide variety of land use matters for clients in the private sector. His responsibilities include attending Planning Commission and Board of Adjustment hearings and working with developers, business owners, and government agencies on land use applications, zoning ordinance text amendments, comprehensive plan updates and other land use issues. He can be reached at or (859) 231-8780, ext. 102.

Debtors May Want To Take It All Off, But The Supreme Court Says Junior Liens Can’t Be Stripped

It’s not an uncommon sight, especially in light of the burst of the housing bubble in recent years: a debtor in bankruptcy has two mortgages on a property with a fair market value of less than the amount of the senior mortgage. The junior mortgage lien is then wholly underwater, so that creditor would receive nothing from the sale of the property. The question then becomes, can the debtor void those liens in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding? The Supreme Court, in an increasingly rare show of unanimity, said “No.”

Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code says, “To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void.”[1] In Bank of America v. Caulkett,[2] the debtors wished to use this provision to strip away the underwater junior liens on their properties. The argument is that, even though the claims from the banks holding the junior mortgage liens are “allowed,” they are no longer “secured.” The definitions under §506(a)(1) seem to bear this out, stating that an allowed claim “is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest.”[3] If the lien is not supported by some sort of value in the collateral, the argument goes, then it is not actually secured.

Serious judge about to bang gavel on sounding block in the court room

Predicated on their reading of Dewsnup v. Timm,[4] the Court found otherwise, holding that the junior lien could not be stripped in the proceedings. Dewsnup foreclosed such lien stripping as in the case in Caulkett, suggesting that if an allowed lien is secured with recourse to the underlying collateral, it does not matter if the value of the collateral does not secure the full amount of the lien. Effectively, such a lien does not fall within the scope of §506(d), as it is both “allowed” and, under Dewsnup, “secured.”

Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, did take time to criticize the result in Dewsnup, suggesting that it did not adhere to tenets of standard textual construction in giving what he perceived as two different definitions in related sections of the same code. Thomas hinted strongly that the court may be willing to overrule Dewsnup, but declined to do so.

The result in this case is not surprising in light of Dewsnup¸ which most courts have relatively ignored save for the very specific circumstances at issue in that case. If a debtor in bankruptcy could strip the junior lien and ultimately keep the property, the debtor would then receive the value of any appreciation in the property, free from the junior lien. Caulkett is a clear win for lenders willing to provide junior mortgages, but a much bigger loss for those with second mortgages on underwater properties. Also, this ruling could stall loss mitigation negotiations as junior mortgage lienholders can maintain an effective veto over talks between the senior mortgage lender and the debtor. At the same time, loan modifications from senior mortgage holders can only make the debtor more solvent and better able to pay the junior lien as well. For more information about how the Caulkett decision affects lenders and property owners with second mortgages, or assistance with mortgage liens, contact the attorneys at McBrayer.

BMacGregorBrittany C. MacGregor is an associate attorney practicing in the Lexington office of McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, PLLC. She is a graduate of Transylvania University and the University of Kentucky College of Law. Ms. MacGregor’s practice focuses on real estate law, including title examination, title insurance, clearing title issues, deeds, settlement statements, preparation of loan documentation, contract negotiation and preparation, and lease negotiation and preparation. She may be reached at or at (859) 231-8780.

[1] 11 U.S.C. §506(d)

[2] Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, No. 13-1421, ___ U.S. ___ (June 1, 2015).

[3] 11 U.S.C. §506(a)(1)

[4] Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).

Public Improvement Liens on Government-Owned Projects

While prior blog posts have discussed the basics of mechanics liens as they relate to private construction projects, this post addresses public improvement liens on property owned by the state, a subdivision or agency thereof, or by any city, county, urban-county, or charter county government (hereafter collectively “Government Entity”).[1] As one may imagine, while the principle purpose behind the filing of public improvement liens and private mechanics liens is the same (i.e. to ensure payment for labor, materials and/or supplies furnished on the project), perfection and enforcement of public improvement liens on property owned by a Government Entity differs significantly from the perfection and enforcement of mechanic’s liens against privately owned property.

KRS 376.210 et seq. addresses the filing and perfection of public improvement liens as they relate to property owned by a Government Entity. As you will note below, the time frames for filing and perfecting public improvement liens on property owned by a Government Entity are shorter than for private mechanic’s liens. However, the most significant difference is that, where the property is owned by a Government Entity, the lien claimant has a lien on the funds due the general contractor from the owner of the property improved rather than a lien on the property itself (as with a private mechanic’s lien).[2] The public improvement lien shall be for the full amount owed for labor, materials and/or supplies furnished on the public project and shall be superior to all other liens created thereafter.[3]

The statement of public improvement lien must be filed by the lien claimant within sixty (60) days after the last day of the month in which any labor, materials and/or supplies were furnished or by the date of substantial completion, whichever is later.[4] The lien statement must include the amount due, the date on which labor, materials and/or supplies were last furnished, and the name of the public improvement upon which the public improvement lien is claimed.[5] The lien statement must be filed in the county clerk’s office of the county in which the seat of government of the owner of the property is located.[6]

Prague ,Czech Republic - June 14, 2011:Yellow Cut truck on the highway construction in front of Ruzyne Airport.The Cat brand is the cornerstone Caterpillar representing products and services made by Caterpillar. ** Note: Visible grain at 100%, best at

Once the lien statement has been filed, in order to properly perfect the lien on the funds, the lien claimant must deliver an attested copy of the lien statement to the public authority which contracted for improvement of the subject Government Entity-owned property and must file with that public authority a signed copy of a letter addressed to the contractor owing the lien claimant monies, along with a post office receipt, showing that an attested copy of the lien statement has been sent by the lien claimant to the contractor via certified mail.[7] At that point, the lien claimant shall have a lien on the funds due the contractor which is superior to any subsequently perfected liens.[8]

The public authority is then required to endorse on the attested copy of the lien statement the date if its receipt and shall deduct and withhold the amount claimed from any amount due the contractor or which may become due the contractor.[9] Unless the contractor, within thirty (30) days after delivery of the attested copy of the lien statement, files a written protest with the public authority disputing the correctness of the amount or its liability for payment to the lien claimant, the public authority will pay the lien claimant the amount withheld.[10] If the contractor does file a written protest with the public authority within the 30 day time period, the public authority is required to promptly provide the lien claimant with written notice of such protest and shall continue to hold the withheld amount until directed by the contractor to make payment to the lien claimant or until it is directed to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction.[11] The lien claimant must then file suit for enforcement of its lien and have summons served on the public authority within thirty (30) days after written notice of the protest is mailed to the lien claimant or the lien shall be automatically released and the withheld funds paid to the contractor.[12] All lawsuits for the enforcement of a public improvement lien must be filed in the Circuit Court of the county in which the property on which the labor, materials and/or supplies are provided (except where the property is owned by a public university).[13]

The time frames for filing and perfecting a public improvement lien as opposed to a private mechanic’s lien are much shorter and the requirements for perfecting such a lien are very specific. A public improvement lien is an effective tool to ensure payment for labor and/or materials supplied by the lien claimant on a public project owned by a Government Entity. However, as is clear, such a tool must be used with precision and efficiency.

For more information about public improvement liens or liens in general, contact the attorneys of McBrayer.

BYatesBrendan Yates joined the Lexington office of the firm as an associate in 2002. Brendan is a member of the firm’s Litigation Department, where he focuses his practice on construction and real estate litigation, workers’ compensation defense litigation, insurance defense and commercial litigation. He has successfully defended his clients in state and federal courts, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the Kentucky Supreme Court, and in administrative agency proceedings in Kentucky. He can be reached at or (859) 231-8780, ext. 208.

This article is intended as a summary of state and federal law and does not constitute legal advice.

[1] The information contained herein is intended as a general overview of the basic requirements for filing and perfecting a public improvement lien. It is not exhaustive and does not contain a detailed procedure for the filing and perfection of such liens.

[2] KRS 376.010(1).

[3] KRS 376.210.

[4] KRS 376.230(1).

[5] Id.

[6] KRS 376.230(2).

[7] KRS 376.240.

[8] KRS 376.240.

[9] KRS 376.250(1).

[10] KRS 376.250(2).

[11] KRS 376.250(3).

[12] KRS 376.250(4).

[13] KRS 376.250(5).